

The Emerging Threat Matrix

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- 1. Cyber what's changing
- 2. What does it means to me
- 3. Aren't I stopping it already
- 4. What should good look like



Cyber...so what's the problem?

In Top 3 Risk register for numerous European

countries.....why NOW?



- 1990's PoC Discover and Recover
- 2000's cybercrime target the masses
 - Protect the users IP and the infrastructure
- 2010+ Targeted attack Business IP
 - Information = 40% business value (Symantec State of Information EMEA 2012)
- Impacts profitability
- Impacts Gross Domestic Produce (GDP)



Cyber Evolution – Isn't this just Nation state?




Hobbyists
Personal motive

Organized crime
Skilled individuals

State sponsored?
Sophisticated groups



Levels of sophitication



Time



Business Impact: examples from the field









How do we measure Cyber success?





What does it mean???



- 71.5% thought there security was between good to excellent
- 45% said "NO" when asked if their budget is achieving a strong security posture
- 51% either unsure or said NO when asked if the technology they use would block a modern day attack
- 72% had a data breach in the last year!

Ponemon Research: UK data 2103 Cyber Security in the Trenches




So we wait.....






We focus on the volume problem.



Significant Compromise Still Exists!




221 Average Net New Incidents Per Week at Only 1 Gbps!







What's the probability of it happening to me? Industry Average targeted Incidents in 2h 2012



Just how real is it right now? – 21 days in June



APT Infections by Industry




Under the headlines













Source: FireEye Advanced Threat Report, March 2013 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report, 2013



What have you seen more of (last 12mth)?



- 48% DDoS & Botnets
- 44% advanced/zero day attacks
- 32% Spear phishing/social engineering
- 11% traditional malware

Ponemon Research: UK data 2103 Cyber Security in the Trenches



What is the gap in our strategies?



Advanced threat lifecycle












Exploit detection is critical

Every stage after it can be hidden or obfuscated




Todays tactics




Initiated by: Spear phishing emails using common terms

- 1. Shipping and delivery (UPS)
- 2. Finance
- 3. General Business



Looking at the end state will fail with todays attacks

- 1 System gets exploited
 - Social engineering
 - Obfuscated JavaScript code
 - Exploited IE 6 zero-day vulnerability
- 2 Web server delivers malware
 - Servers mapped by dynamic DNS
 - XOR encoded malware EXE delivered
 - No Signatures
- Malware calls home & long-term control established
 - Complete control of infected system
 - Further payloads downloaded
 - C&C located here in Taiwan!
 - Using outbound port 443 (SSL)




How do we solve the Cyber gap problem?






Todays IT environments - Where's Wally?





Traditional Defenses Don't Work

The new breed of attacks evade signature-based defenses





We keep responding in the same old ways

- blocked Windows protocols on external firewalls
- enforced auth. tokens and VPN usage
- bolstered patching regimens
- installed IDS/IPS @ gateway/desktop
- segmented networks to contain worm damage



Attacks by the APT are human driven; not generally polymorphic



CISO view of the Problem

- Targeted = you're first to see = means there is no signature or behavioral block
- Most environments to complex to see the anomalies
- Compromise time typically months if not years
- Understanding the attackers motives & actions
- Need to see the entire attack stream & gather the forensics



Targeted – We can't wait to learn from others

Legacy Pattern-Matching Detection Model

MATCH

- Signature-Based
- Reactive
- Only known threats
- Many false negatives


New Virtual Execution Model



- Signature-less
- Dynamic, real-time
- Known/unknown threats
- Minimal false positives



We need to be able to join the DOTs to comprehend the attack





FireEye Captured Aurora on Day Zero

Exploitcode	Kemel32	API Name: WriteFile Address: 202964316	900		
Exploitcode	Kernel32	API Name: ReadFile Address: 202964254	900		
Exploitcode	Kernel32	API Name: WriteFile Address: 202964316	900		
Exploitcode	Kernel32	API Name: VirtualProtect Address: 202964803	900		
Exploitcode	Kemel32	API Name: LoadLibraryA Address: 202964499 Params: [shdocwi]	900		
File	Created	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\a.exe	900		
File	Created	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\b.exe Decryption complete.	900		
File	Delete	CAD-assessed and Cotting Administrated Annihilation Databases	900		
Process	Started	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\u00e4.exe C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\u00e4b.exe Packed: yes GUI: no MD5: 9f880ac607cbd7cdfffa609c5883c708 SHA1: 08b33a64a85b93530d07ec3ea611e4875ee6c169	1304	900	34816
Malicious Alert	Misc Anomaly	Detail: Process started from a packed binary			
Malicious Alert	Anomaly Tag	Message: Startup behavior anomalies observed Detail: Browser started an unknown process			
File	Date Change	C:\WINDOWS\system32\Rasmon.dll MD5: 0f9c5408335833e72fe73e6166b5a01b SHA1: cfa826c339898e882a1276b694fc935d56b83093 Encrypted	1304		90112
Regkey	Added	REGISTRY/MACHINE/SYSTEM/ControlSet001/Services/UDSXZE	544		
Malicious Alert	Misc Anomaly	Message: System services modified Detail: service loaded through windows Callback			
Regkey	Deleted	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEMControlSet001\Services\UpsXZE \\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\	1320		
Regkey	Added	REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\RasXkNk Captured	1320		
Network	Dns Query	Protocol Type: udp Qtype: Host Address Hostname: 360.homeunix.com	1320		
Network	Connected	Protocol Type; tcp_IP Address: Destination_Port: 443	1320		
Malicious Alert	Misc Anomaly	Message: Malware communication observed			
File	Created	C:\WINDOWS\DFS.bat	1304		
Process	Started	C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\WINDOWS\DFS.bat" Packed: no GUI: no MD5: 84ddf54db542b2eb9ef08144fb6e3645 SHA1: 43c3eeadfd2c3aadd32f9a7c750e4b1465d3bc9a	1280	1304	375808
Process	Terminated	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\b.exe	1304	900	
File	Delete	C:\Documents and Settings\Administrator\Application Data\b.exe	1280		
File	Delete	C:\WINDOWS\DFS.bat	1280		
Appexception		Exception Faulting Address: 0x65 Exception Code: 0xC0000005 Exception Level: SECOND_CHANCE Exception Type: STATUS_ACCESS_VIOLATION Instruction Address: 0x00000000781444dc Description: Data from Faulting Address controls Branch Selection Classification: UNKNOWN	900		
Malicious Alert	Misc Anomaly	Detail: Crash detected due to second chance			
File	Created	C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools for Windows (x86)\DBG0.tmp	1312		
Uac	Service	UpsXZE			
	Misc Anomaly	Detail: System service running/stopped			

What should you seek in the solution?





Summary

- Targeted attacks ARE personal NO signature!
 - Often multi vectored and very specific
 - Assume the attackers will know your weak points
- Todays IT is complex, hard to maintain complex standards (SANS20, etc...)
 - Anomalies are hard to spot, can you join the DOTs!
- Often the subtler the breach the bigger the impact
 - If you look just at the end state you miss the attack detail
- Breaches will occur
 - Can you mitigate or marginalize
 - Can you gather the forensic evidence to understand the attack





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